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I. Abstract 
 Baseball fans discuss and remember the heroics of Major League Baseball players and 
managers. However, team executives operate away from the crowds, in the front office to draft, 
trade for, and sign talented players and managers to construct successful teams. The intent of this 
thesis is to first rank and analyze these general managers and presidents of baseball operations 
through finance and baseball statistics. Then, I will examine team statistics to determine what 
statistics correlate to winning. Two of the general managers, Theo Epstein and Dan O’Dowd, 
will then be examined more thoroughly to determine how their decisions impacted their 
respective teams. Ultimately, this paper will conclude with an assertion that the strategic actions 
of upper level executives in Major League Baseball directly positively and negatively impact the 
performance of their teams. 
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II. Introduction 
Major League Baseball (hereafter referred to as “the MLB” or “MLB”) has a storied 
legacy. Countless videos, articles, and books have been created on championship teams, gutsy 
managers, and the greatest players of all time.1 2 3 These managers and players contribute 
directly to their respective teams, providing measurable statistics that determine their efficiency, 
ability, and intellect. However, these managers and players are not randomly assigned to their 
teams. They are drafted, signed, traded for, and hired by higher-level executives within each 
organization. These executives operate behind the scenes, draw far fewer headlines than the 
managers and players, and, until Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics was recognized for his 
ability,4 were not recognized for their success other than receiving World Series rings from their 
owners. This thesis will bring baseball executives to the forefront, arguing that their actions 
greatly determine the success of the team on a season-to-season or game-to-game basis. 
 The teams’ owners are the bosses of each organization. They are responsible for hiring 
immediate inferiors to manage the team’s finances and baseball operations. They are CEOs, 
presidents, and entrepreneurs, making their money outside of baseball before purchasing a MLB 
team as a long-term investment or expensive hobby. As a result, owners do not possess expert 
knowledge in baseball statistics, free agent signings, or evaluating high school, collegiate, and 
international talent. This is precisely why they hire general managers and presidents of baseball 
                                                          
1 Montville, Leigh. The Big Bam: The Life and Times of Babe Ruth. 
2 Joe Torre and Tom Verducci. The Yankee Years. 
3 Verducci, Tom. The Cubs Way: The Zen of Building the Best Team in Baseball and Breaking the Curse. 
4 Lewis, Michael. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. 
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operations. These are the executives who work tirelessly to employ the team’s budget to create 
competitive teams. 
 Presidents of baseball operations rank higher than general managers if the two positions 
exist within the same organization. The title “president of baseball operations” has only recently 
been invented and is designed to promote existing general managers instead of releasing them to 
sign a contract with another team. Fewer than half of the MLB teams currently employ both a 
president of baseball operations and a general manager. 
 Presidents of baseball operations occupy the same role as general managers on teams that 
do not employ a president of baseball operations. These two jobs are very similar and, as will be 
explained in the first empirical section, having a president of baseball operations working with a 
general manager does not correlate with a higher win total. Therefore, these two positions are 
charged with the same task from their owner: Create the most competitive baseball team possible 
within the resources (budget) available. 
 Baseball is not a fair game. There is no salary cap that teams must stay under to ensure 
that every team pays their players the same amount. Instead, teams rule baseball through their 
wallets. The New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Los Angeles Dodgers have larger budgets 
from richer owners and greater revenue from merchandise, media contracts, and ticket sales due 
to residing in larger market cities. As a result, general managers for teams with less money are 
severely handicapped and are forced to find and draft talented players who succeed before their 
first large MLB contract, or trade for cheaper players who “fly under the radar” and provide 
success when other teams believe they are not capable. Essentially, teams with lower budgets 
must take higher risks on unproven, younger players and hope they become successful, while 
rich teams can throw money at proven all-stars in the offseason.  
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 This thesis will attempt to provide answers to the question: How do you evaluate the 
success of a general manager and/or president of baseball operations? The two answers to that 
question are: Base their success on their total wins or on their cost per win. Teams with low 
budgets have succeeded and won World Series, but for the most part they are more likely to lose 
games. However, a general manager who can win more games with a lower budget shows that he 
knows how to evaluate, develop, and manage talent exceptionally well and cost-effectively. 
 In order to understand executive success in building winning teams, I will analyze 
various baseball statistics (hits, home runs, etc.) and determine whether they are correlated with 
the total number of regular season wins. These three regressions will determine which statistics 
or types of players are more beneficial to teams, providing a clearer picture of the factors general 
managers should focus on. Some variables are strongly correlated with team victories, while 
other variables commonly viewed as critical to a team are, in fact, not correlated. 
 Finally, I will provide a case study on two executives, Theo Epstein and Dan O’Dowd, to 
juxtapose the transactions of a “highly successful” general manager with an “unsuccessful” one. 
These transactions will enable me to paint a complete picture of the activities of the two general 
managers, analyzing in depth more than would be possible with only data on general managers 
and team statistics.  
 On a larger scale, the goal of this thesis is to analyze upper management in an 
organization. All companies have upper level executives whose success can only be measured 
through the company value or annual revenue. Baseball provides vast amounts of data with 
which to analyze the success of its executives. Additionally, baseball is a sport with a winner and 
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a loser, pitting two executives against one another every game. This sport allows me to analyze 
executives in far greater depth than in any other business sector.5 
 
  
                                                          
5 There will be no “Literature Review” section in this thesis. Instead, I will discuss literary sources before the two 
empirical analysis sections and the case study. 
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III. Data Review 
 I created the data set for the first regression from numerous sources while combining 
sixteen seasons of data for the second empirical analysis section. The data for both analysis 
sections describes the last seventeen years of the MLB, from 2000 to 2016. This provides 30 
teams’ data over seventeen years, resulting in 510 observations for every variable, producing in a 
large sample size. 
 The most difficult and time-consuming process in data collection was acquiring the 
names of every general manager and president of baseball operations since 2000. There is no 
database that lists every one of these in spreadsheet form. Additionally, individual teams do not 
have a history of their executives on their websites. Thus, my process for obtaining this 
information began through Wikipedia. Wikipedia has, for every MLB team, a page titled “List of 
[MLB team’s] owners and executives.”6 From there, I looked up the team’s current front office 
to obtain information on their executive positions.7 There, I saw that, if a team had a “president 
of baseball operations,” he was either listed as such or as one of a few similar titles, like 
“Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations,” or “Vice President, Baseball Operations.” 
These titles varied from team to team, but their job description remained the same. Therefore, 
these men were treated as the same under the category “president of baseball operations.” 
 After establishing the two categories “general manager” and “president of baseball 
operations,” I visited each teams’ “List of [MLB team’s] owners and executives” Wikipedia page 
again, clicking on each individual executive to record when they began and ended their career 
                                                          
6 “List of San Francisco Giants owners and executives.” Wikipedia.  
7 Front Office Directory.” San Francisco Giants. 
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with the team. I recognize that Wikipedia is a fan-edited page, thus I visited each of the sources 
to confirm the validity of the information. I will not cite each of these sources, as that would 
result in citing 55 sources for general managers and fifteen sources for each president of baseball 
operations. Instead, I will cite one of the Wikipedia pages, and an example source.8 9 Some of the 
general managers and presidents of baseball operations were fired mid-season, so I visited those 
teams’ season data to accurately determine the wins and losses the executives accounted for.10 
 Baseball playoff results are well documented with multiple online sources available for 
such information. The variables “playoff berth” and “World Series wins” are available on 
Wikipedia and sourced through multiple sources. I will cite these as I cited the general managers 
and presidents of baseball operations.11 Baseball teams can qualify for the postseason by either 
winning their division or by obtaining the best record in their league outside of the division 
winners, a.k.a. winning the Wild Card. These two categories are located on the same Wikipedia 
page.12 
 The variables “Annual Attendance,” “Franchise Value,” and “Annual Team Salary” are 
used in my first empirical analysis section. These three variables are derived from three separate 
sources as this information is not as abundant as team statistics and World Series victories. 
Baseball Chronology holds the annual franchise valuations from 2000 to 2006.13 They cite 
Forbes for the actual valuation of said franchises. I used Statista, also citing Forbes, for annual 
franchise valuations from 2007 to 2016.14 Statista has a page for each team’s valuations 
                                                          
8 “List of San Francisco Giants owners and executives.” 
9 Haft, Chris. “Bochy, Sabean extend contracts; GM moves up.” 
10 “2007 Boston Red Sox Schedule.” Baseball Reference. 
11 “List of World Series Champions.” Wikipedia.  
12 “Major League Baseball division winners.” Wikipedia.  
13 “MLB Franchise Valuations.” Baseball Chronology. 
14 “Arizona Diamondbacks franchise value from 2002 to 2017 (in million U.S. dollars).” Statista. 
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separately; I will cite one such page. I obtained annual attendance from a different website.15 
Finally, I obtained data for each team’s annual team salary online from a different source who, in 
turn, cites The Associated Press, a nonprofit news agency.16 
 All data in the second empirical regression describes each MLB team’s statistics on an 
annual basis. This information is available, by year, online at Baseball Reference.17 
  
  
                                                          
15 “MLB Ballpark Attendance.” Ballparks of Baseball. 
16 “MLB Team Payrolls.” Steve The Ump. 
17 “2016 MLB Team Statistics.” Baseball Reference. 
12 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis: General Managers and Presidents of Baseball Operations 
 When analyzing transactions on a baseball team, there are three main executive positions: 
The owners, The presidents of baseball operations, and the general managers. There are other 
executive positions in the front office that the owner oversees, like the director or vice president 
of finance, the human resources director, and the ticket office accountant,18 but none of them 
contributes to drafting and trading baseball players. The owners are the heads of the 30 MLB 
teams. Often taking titles like Chairman or Chief Executive Officer,19 the owner is responsible 
for overseeing the entire operation of the franchise. He (there are currently no female general 
managers or presidents of baseball operations in the MLB) is responsible for hiring other 
executives to oversee parts of the franchise, including hiring the baseball executives. As such, 
the owner does not contribute directly to baseball operations, he simply hires a team, led by 
either a president of baseball operations or a general manager, to put together a roster of players 
and adjust that roster as necessary. 
i. Owners 
 Owners do not play a pivotal role in the construction of a MLB team. They are largely 
only responsible for providing a checkbook while simultaneously devoting their time, energy, 
and creativity into marketing, stadium improvement or building, and working with other owners 
to change rules.20 They are much more focused on the business side of baseball. Literature on 
baseball owners has supported this claim. For example, “Pay and Performance in Major League 
Baseball” is an economic journal that focused on the baseball strike in the 1970s and the revenue 
                                                          
18 “Front Office.” Baltimore Orioles. 
19 “Front Office.” Baltimore Orioles. 
20 Wine, Steve. “Baseball owners look at rule changes to speed up game.” 
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players lost out on during that strike. It discussed the owners’ ability to control the revenue 
stream to players and determine how much money players as a union would receive,21 but there 
is no mention of owners directly trading players. Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, and 
American Baseball to 1920 tells a similar story, focusing on how owners emerged victorious in 
the labor-management battle.22 This book portrays the owners’ checkbooks as more important to 
the sport of baseball than the owners themselves. Therefore, literature has concluded that owners 
are most beneficial when paying for talent. 
 The only time owners have been considered to impact directly the signing of baseball 
players has been during instances of collusion. “Financial Restraint in the Free Agent Labor 
Market for Major League Baseball: Players Look at Strike Three” examines how owners stood 
together to unfairly impact the free agent market during off seasons in the 1980s. The paper 
asserts that after the 1985 and 1986 seasons, “owners once again boycotted the free agent 
market.”23 It concludes that the owners successfully altered the salary of the free agent pool with 
collusion: “the mean ratios were 28% lower for the unweighted ratios and 38% lower for the 
weighted ratios. This outcome suggests that the free agents in 1985 and 1986 did suffer 
economic consequences.”24 Once again, literature suggested that owners are not directly 
involved in winning baseball games. They impact the general market for players, hire baseball 
executives, and provide as much money as they can afford to help the team do better. 
 Owners frequently hire executives from successful teams to try to gain an upper hand on 
the competition. The wealthier owners in bigger markets are more capable of recruiting and 
                                                          
21 Scully, Gerald W. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball." 
22 Burk, Robert F. Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, and American Baseball to 1920. 
23 Bruggink, Thomas H., and David R. Rose. “Financial Restraint in the Free Agent Labor Market for Major League 
Baseball: Players Look at Strike Three.” 
24 Bruggink, Thomas H., and David R. Rose. 
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paying for talented executives than other teams, furthering their inherent competitive advantages. 
There is no salary cap when it comes to paying either players or baseball executives. It seems 
unlikely that smaller market teams with limited payrolls would be able to compete in this 
environment. 
ii. General Managers & Presidents of Baseball Operations 
 General managers and presidents of baseball operations perform very similar tasks and 
are, fundamentally, the same position. Not every team has a president of baseball operations. In 
fact, that title was recently created by many teams to “promote” their general managers to a 
higher position and offload some of their travel and workload by bringing on another executive 
as the general manager. For example, in 2015, the Oakland Athletics “promoted general manager 
Billy Beane to the role of executive vice president of baseball operations. Additionally, David 
Forst [was] promoted from assistant general manager to the role of general manager.”25 While 
the Athletics are a small market team with a small budget compared to other MLB teams, Beane 
led them to numerous winning seasons and playoff appearances. The Athletics were rewarding 
him for this success. This move did not drastically alter the roles of the two men: Beane was still 
in charge of Forst and had the last say in transactions that the team wanted to make. However, 
these types of promotions are becoming more popular in baseball to retain assistant general 
managers and prevent them from “seeking other general manager vacancies elsewhere.”26 
Fundamentally, president of baseball operations is a clever title created by owners to keep as 
many highly skilled executives in one front office as possible. The former assistant general 
manager also signs a more lucrative contract with the same team, receiving pay comparable to 
                                                          
25 Adams, Steve. “Athletics Promote Billy Beane, David Forst.” 
26 Adams, Steve. 
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other general managers in the league. Presidents of baseball operations are paid even more. For 
example, Theo Epstein recently signed a five-year extension with the Cubs worth more than $50 
million.27 
 Michael Lewis’s Moneyball shed light on the evolution of baseball statisticians like Bill 
James but, more importantly, focused on how Major League teams began using statistics to find 
valuable players when other teams undervalued them. The Oakland Athletics, led by general 
manager Billy Beane, were first to employ this tactic.28 As a small market team with a 
comparatively lacking budget, they lost many great players following the 2001 season (Jason 
Giambi, Johnny Damon, Jason Isringhausen)29 to teams that could pay more for them. Beane 
employed Bill James’s statistics to acquire undervalued players and create a successful team 
despite a lacking budget. This tactic contradicted previous scouting techniques that largely based 
their evaluations on eyeballing a player and determining if he was exceptional based upon 
individual scout’s knowledge of the game. Mathematics cut through the biased eye of numerous 
scouts, instead creating a universal system which omitted individual flaws. Since Beane’s 2002 
season, other general managers have employed similar tactics to evaluate players. However, 
current statistics, advanced as they are, are not capable of predicting teams’ records perfectly. 
Upper management can still make bad trades and panic when players are injured. Some general 
managers and owners are better at recovering from losses than others. My study will attempt to 
rank the general managers and, through a case study, show the variance in their ability to 
construct successful teams. 
                                                          
27 Phillips, Ryan. “Theo Epstein, Cubs Agree to Massive Five-Year Extension.” 
28 Lewis, Michael. 
29 Lewis, Michael. 
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There have been many articles written on the effectiveness of general managers in many 
sports, however they have not provided empirical evidence to support their claims. Articles 
referencing the savvy of general managers have referenced their teams’ records, playoff 
appearances, and longevity at their position.30 Some articles list basic facts such as “average 
player spending” without providing any analysis into executive behavior whatsoever.31 
Additionally, they do not go into detail regarding the specific moves made (save for one or two 
major moves). Baseball, unlike other sports, has numerous minor league levels and hundreds of 
players at those levels and in the majors. Players who fail to produce are sent down and other 
players take their place. Trades are executed when injuries occur in a 162-game season, longer 
than any other sports season. The length of the season means that more trades must be executed 
as more players are sent down and called up from the minors, than any other sport. My study will 
examine the effectiveness of general managers not only for their one major success or failure, but 
also for their win totals and success given their budget. It will determine which executives have 
more success than others and attempt to explain why.  
 Presidents of baseball operations for organizations that have them are the equivalent of 
general managers for teams that do not have the position. The proof is in the regression: 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 =
𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒: 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢. 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Davidoff, Ken. "Ranking Baseball's Top 10 GMs -- Yes, Cashman Makes the List." 
31 Smith, Chris. "The NBA's Best and Worst GMs: Wins vs Payroll." 
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DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Wins in a Season 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Presidents of Baseball 
Operations (dummy 
variable) 
-0.076 
(1.119) 
The regression reveals that having a president of baseball operations does not directly correlate 
with winning or losing more games. Instead, it affirms that “general manager” and “president of 
baseball operations” are merely titles. If a team has a president of baseball operations, that man 
oversees running the organization, making trades, drafting prospects, and evaluating talent. If a 
team does not possess a president, the general manager assumes those duties.  
 General managers32 can be ranked through numerous variables. An owner of a baseball 
team visualizes success through wins, the cost of a team, and the profitability of the team 
(attendance, profit, franchise value). However, general managers are tasked with creating a roster 
and pipeline of future players and crafting a winning team in the short and long run with the 
budget their owner provides. Baseball, unlike other sports, has no salary cap. Therefore, teams 
are free to pay as much money as they can to sign or trade for players that will contribute directly 
                                                          
32 For this thesis, I will refer to the senior baseball executive in all organizations as the general manager unless 
contrasting the two positions. 
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to the team’s success. This provides an unfair advantage for teams with more money. The 
equation utilized is 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝑢. 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Wins in a Season 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Total Team Salary 
(Dollars) 
9.11e-08 
(1.19e-08) 
The r-squared value for the regression is 0.1040, with 509 total observations. This indicates that 
approximately 10% of the variance in games won annually results from the amount of money 
paid to players in that year. This may not seem like much, but 10% of a 162-game season is 
sixteen games, more than enough to propel a team into the playoffs or prevent them from 
qualifying. For example, the New York Yankees consistently have one of the top three budgets 
every year.33 They have won 26 World Series, sixteen more than the second team. While part of 
this success stems from the fact that the Yankees are one of the oldest teams in baseball history, 
their payroll has allowed them to enjoy success to this day, appearing in the playoffs in thirteen 
years since 2000.34 
                                                          
33 “MLB Team Payrolls.” Steve The Ump. 
34 “New York Yankees.” Wikipedia.  
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 Differences in salary between different teams directly impacts the expected win total of 
those teams, but the two variables “number of wins” and “cost per win” are the most efficient 
way to measure the capability of general managers. They are tasked by their owners to win as 
many games as possible because winning regular season games directly improves various other 
aspects of the franchise. Winning baseball games directly correlates with playoff appearances, 
World Series titles, attendance, and franchise value. 
 First: winning baseball games correlates with playoff appearances and World Series 
titles. This is a self-explanatory regression as teams that show success in the regular season are 
more likely to qualify for a postseason berth. The two regressions below show the correlation 
between the two variables. The two equations are, respectively: 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡ℎ = 𝑎 +
𝑏1(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢 and 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢. 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Playoff Berth 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Wins 0.028 
(0.001) 
 
DEPENDENT (1) 
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VARIABLES World Series 
Wins 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Wins 0.003 
(0.0007) 
Both variables are strongly correlated with winning baseball games. The numbers indicate that 
winning more baseball games improves a team’s chances of making the playoffs and winning the 
World Series. The odds of a team making the playoffs is higher than winning a World Series 
(larger coefficient) because winning games in the regular season does not necessarily correlate to 
winning in the postseason. However, teams that are more successful in the regular season do 
have a higher chance of winning the World Series because generally, if they are successful in the 
regular season, they should not crumble in the postseason. Winning games in the regular season 
does directly correlate to making the playoffs, as reaching the playoffs is determined by the 
number of games won in the regular season. 
 Additionally, winning baseball games directly correlates to ballpark attendance and the 
franchise value for that season. This supports that the public enjoys watching teams that win 
more games. If a team is succeeding, people are more inclined to attend the game, buy 
merchandise, or watch the game on television, positively affecting the two dependent variables 
of the next two regressions. Other factors contribute to the franchise value of the team, like 
market size and stadium capacity, but general managers can only control winning and losing.  
21 
 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Annual 
Attendance 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Wins 28985.29 
(2338.17) 
 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Franchise Value 
(millions of 
dollars) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Wins 6.75 
(1.65) 
The r-squared for attendance is significantly higher than the r-squared for the value of the 
franchise (.2323 compared to .0319). This means that 23% of the variance in attendance is 
22 
 
explained by wins. General managers cannot force people to purchase tickets. They can only 
incentivize them to purchase tickets by putting together an exceptional team that wins many 
games. 
 General managers can only control how many games a team wins by forming a good or 
bad team. Their budget directly impacts their ability to do so. Therefore, there are two different 
ways to rank general managers and presidents of baseball operations: By overall win percentage, 
highest to lowest; and by dollars spent per win,35 lowest to highest. Since 2000, there are 54 
general managers who have been at a general manager position for more than 486 games (or 
three seasons).36 I eliminated all general managers who had fewer than 486 games from the lists 
as they have not had enough time to directly affect the team through the MLB draft. 
Additionally, fewer games means a higher sample error. There are some men who are included 
in both the general manager and president of baseball operations lists. These two lists are 
separate instead of combined because teams with general managers and presidents of baseball 
operations would effectively possess twice as many people in the same list. The following lists 
rank the general managers and presidents of baseball operations (separately) by the two above 
categories. 
  
                                                          
35 Annual team payroll divided by wins. Sources: “MLB Team Payrolls” & “2016 MLB Team Statistics.” (and every 
year since 2000) 
36 General manager data. See section III: Data Review. 
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General Managers Ranked by Total Win Percentage: 2000-201637 
Rank General Manager Win Percentage  Rank General Manager Win Percentage 
1 Brian Cashman 0.578068264  28 J.P. Ricciardi 0.49537037 
2 Theo Epstein 0.575308642  29 Sandy Alderson 0.494855967 
3 John Schuerholz 0.566358025  30 Jed Hoyer 0.490740741 
4 Tony Reagins 0.564197531  31 Mark Shapiro 0.490740741 
5 John Mozeliak 0.55829904  32 Larry Beinfest 0.487654321 
6 Dan Evans 0.549382716  33 Ben Cherington 0.486111111 
7 Billy Beane 0.544444444  34 Dave Dombrowski 0.485907559 
8 Dan Duquette 0.538800705  35 Ed Wade 0.483333333 
9 Jerry Dipoto 0.538271605  36 John Hart 0.481481481 
10 Bill Stoneman 0.537037037  37 Kevin Towers 0.481222216 
11 Ned Colletti 0.537037037  38 Neal Huntington 0.476944508 
12 Frank Wren 0.535273369  39 Doug Melvin 0.472222222 
13 Walt Jocketty 0.53433642  40 Josh Byrnes 0.472222222 
14 Ruben Amaro Jr. 0.533950617  41 Michael Hill 0.470017637 
15 Brian Sabean 0.53127572  42 Dayton Moore 0.466891134 
16 Gerry Hunsicker 0.528395062  43 Dan O'Dowd 0.464381832 
17 Jon Daniels 0.527745072  44 Jack Zduriencik 0.46031746 
18 Kenny Williams 0.526331428  45 Jim Bowden 0.452380952 
19 Andrew Friedman 0.516759659  46 Dan O'Brien 0.448559671 
20 Mike Rizzo 0.513888889  47 Rick Hahn 0.447530864 
21 Bill Smith 0.510688859  48 Jim Beattie 0.444444444 
22 Omar Minaya 0.506858711  49 Bill Bavasi 0.443209877 
23 Alex Anthopoulos 0.50308642  50 Dave Littlefield 0.433127572 
24 Tim Purpura 0.502057613  51 Andy MacPhail 0.431216931 
25 Chris Antonetti 0.501234568  52 Jeff Luhnow 0.427160494 
26 Joe Garagiola Jr. 0.501028807  53 Allard Baird 0.41255144 
27 Jim Hendry 0.500353586  54 Chuck LaMar 0.397119342 
 
 
  
                                                          
37 General manager data. See section III: Data Review. 
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General Managers Ranked by Dollars Per Win: 2000-201638 
Rank General Manager Dollars Per Win  Rank General Manager Dollars Per Win 
1 Larry Beinfest 491232.0105  28 Jed Hoyer 1030201.873 
2 Allard Baird 597081.8311  29 Bill Smith 1056217.302 
3 Dave Littlefield 599917.8052  30 Tim Purpura 1064513.529 
4 Chuck LaMar 600055.0631  31 Andy MacPhail 1074882.979 
5 Andrew Friedman 633862.5917  32 John Hart 1089298.323 
6 Billy Beane 651562.2751  33 Frank Wren 1096713.474 
7 Jim Bowden 678068.6372  34 Brian Sabean 1116330.649 
8 Jim Beattie 738873.513  35 Dan Evans 1127056.127 
9 Dan O'Brien 748048.6813  36 Dan Duquette 1139500.651 
10 Gerry Hunsicker 749021.005  37 Jon Daniels 1154498.132 
11 Jeff Luhnow 763683.9402  38 Omar Minaya 1168669.14 
12 Michael Hill 791144.7968  39 Alex Anthopoulos 1174478.349 
13 Neal Huntington 811585.3163  40 John Mozeliak 1185868.929 
14 Mark Shapiro 815195.9781  41 Sandy Alderson 1202146.676 
15 Kevin Towers 841787.8498  42 Dave Dombrowski 1219459.058 
16 J.P. Ricciardi 865718.2015  43 Mike Rizzo 1248206.524 
17 Josh Byrnes 867096.6901  44 Jack Zduriencik 1258356.851 
18 Bill Stoneman 879985.4356  45 Jim Hendry 1285934.85 
19 Dan O'Dowd 921665.7272  46 Tony Reagins 1291120.406 
20 Chris Antonetti 929491.1567  47 Bill Bavasi 1361092.724 
21 Doug Melvin 949384.3326  48 Theo Epstein 1397594.747 
22 Dayton Moore 964380.1303  49 Rick Hahn 1480164.223 
23 Ed Wade 983058.7151  50 Ned Colletti 1480764.141 
24 John Schuerholz 994932.768  51 Jerry Dipoto 1633336.969 
25 Joe Garagiola Jr. 1006681.92  52 Ruben Amaro Jr. 1876824.688 
26 Walt Jocketty 1008057.995  53 Brian Cashman 1986885.557 
27 Kenny Williams 1012155.535  54 Ben Cherington 2189739.966 
 
  
                                                          
38 General manager data. See section III: Data Review. 
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Presidents of Baseball Operations Ranked by Total Win Percentage and Dollars Per Win: 2000-201639 
Rank President of Operations Win %  Rank President of Operations Dollars Per Win 
1 Stan Kasten 0.59414  1 Reid Ryan 678918.5616 
2 Terry McGuirk 0.53858  2 Larry Beinfest 744442.1364 
3 John Schuerholz 0.53527  3 Paul Dolan 765774.1401 
4 Jon Daniels 0.52537  4 Mark Shapiro 929491.1567 
5 David Montgomery 0.52510  5 Larry Dolan 930513.5999 
6 Mike Rizzo 0.51389  6 Dayton Moore 964380.1303 
7 Mark Shapiro 0.50123  7 Stan Kasten 977751.9504 
8 Paul Dolan 0.49559  8 Terry McGuirk 1012113.586 
9 Theo Epstein 0.49383  9 John Schuerholz 1096713.474 
10 Dave Dombrowski 0.49208  10 Andy MacPhail 1099657.316 
11 Andy MacPhail 0.48236  11 Mike Rizzo 1248206.524 
12 Larry Dolan 0.47942  12 David Montgomery 1286632.833 
13 Larry Beinfest 0.46708  13 Theo Epstein 1320991.174 
14 Dayton Moore 0.46689  14 Dave Dombrowski 1446968.138 
15 Reid Ryan 0.44907  15 Jon Daniels 1604597.54 
 
In reviewing these lists, the main aspects that stand out are that most successful general 
managers like Theo Epstein and Brian Cashman rank very high in overall wins and almost last in 
dollars per win. This shows that salaries impact wins more than 10%. The highest general 
manager win percentage is 0.578 while the lowest is 0.397, representing an average of 92 wins 
and 64 wins per season, respectively. Sixteen games of this 28-game difference are accounted for 
by differences in salary. Therefore, the difference in salary accounts for approximately 57% of 
the total difference in wins between the highest and lowest general managers. Only one general 
manager ranks in the top ten in both lists: Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics. 
 The rest of the variance in winning games and the season to season success of the team is 
determined by annual team statistics. There are many statistics in baseball attempting to analyze 
players and teams, all to answer whether the player or a team will win more games. Batting 
                                                          
39 President of Baseball Operations data. See section III: Data Review. 
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average, home runs hit, on base percentage, walks, etc. are all statistics that are believed to be 
indicative of performance. The next section of empirical analysis analyzes statistics by team to 
determine which statistics are important, if there is a type of team or player that is better than 
others, and which statistics baseball executives use to improve their teams. 
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V. Empirical Analysis: The Importance of Team Statistics 
 General managers utilize statistics now more than ever to determine which players to 
draft. The following regressions depict team statistics from 2000 to 2016 and are designed to 
highlight a problem. There are too many statistics in the MLB and many of those statistics are 
meaningful for an individual player while simultaneously not being correlated to winning 
baseball games when examined on a team level. These regressions will show which team 
statistics general managers focus on when constructing a team. They analyze team statistics like 
these, observe their team’s weaknesses, and acquire players to counteract these shortcomings. 
There have been numerous articles written on baseball statistics and the often-times 
misleading story they tell with regards to the genuine value of players. Bill James was credited as 
a leading member in the baseball statistics industry back in the 1970s when he began publishing 
annual books titled The Bill James Baseball Abstract.40 These books revolutionized baseball 
statistics that were, at the time, primitive. James invented new statistics by combining existing 
statistics into weighted equations that, ultimately, produced a more in depth analysis of players’ 
overall value.41 James published works constantly, and his revised Abstract in 2001 introduced a 
complex formula designed to rank and evaluate baseball players based upon one number: win 
shares.42 This number resulted from taking all known metrics used to evaluate players and, 
through mathematical equations and weighing different statistical categories appropriately, arrive 
at a single number. I will not be using Bill James’s model in my research; I will be constructing 
my own model using common baseball statistics found on Baseball Reference43 to construct an 
                                                          
40 James, Bill. The Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. 
41 James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. 
42 James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. 
43 "Baseball Reference." Baseball-Reference.com. 
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efficient model. This attempt will not be as efficient as Bill James’s model as he had access to 
much more data over a longer period, but my data will be from 2000 to 2016, enough 
observations to qualify as a large sample size. This will allow me to analyze the modern baseball 
game, which has changed since the 1970s with the introduction of modern technology, weight 
training, and a reduction in steroid use. Additionally, James and these other sources focused 
more on individual player statistics,44 45 while my model focuses on team statistics. Many teams 
currently utilize statisticians who have borrowed from Bill James to gain the upper hand on the 
competition, drafting and trading for players that may not appear to be talented based on basic 
statistics like batting average and runs batted in.46 47  
Different teams play in different stadiums and climates, and these external factors play a 
key role in how upper management builds a team. For example: the Colorado Rockies play at 
high altitude in Denver, where the thin air allows the ball to travel farther. Naturally, the Rockies 
sign and draft more power hitters than contact hitters or pitchers as better power hitters in that 
environment generate more runs. Conversely, the San Francisco Giants play right next to San 
Francisco Bay, where the weather is foggy, the air heavy, and the wind fierce.48 They focus more 
on dominant pitching and fast, athletic hitters to help on defense and try to get on base instead of 
hitting home runs. Studies have been conducted regarding the productivity of teams and the 
effectiveness of hitting in various stadiums. One such study ranked stadiums in the American 
League (half of Major League Baseball) according to batting average on balls in play.49 
                                                          
44 John Thorn and Pete Palmer. The Hidden Game of Baseball. 
45 Keri, Jonah. Baseball Between the Numbers: Why Everything You Know About the Game Is Wrong. 
46 Lewis, Michael. 
47 Gabriel B. Costa, Michael R. Hubber and John T. Saccoman. Understanding Sabermetrics: An Introduction to the 
Science of Baseball. 
48 I have attended and watched many Giants game. 
49 "Determining How Ballparks Affect Batter's Ability to Create Hits." Packer Intersections. 
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However, this data has not been incorporated into a more comprehensive model that considers 
other factors to determine a team’s ability to win. Additionally, the study did not factor in the 
types of hits (single, double, triple, home run) into the equation, treating these equally when they 
indicate different types of hitters (singles indicate less power, home runs indicate the most). The 
case study comparing Theo Epstein to Dan O’Dowd and the variables “home runs hit” and 
“home runs surrendered” utilize the concept of stadium environmental impacts to explain general 
managers’ decisions. This allows for a more in depth analysis of upper management’s actions 
with regards to types of players drafted and traded for. 
i. First Regression: Annual MLB Team Statistics 
 The regression shown below is an examination of annual MLB statistics from all 30 
teams from 2000 to 2016. Its r-squared score is 0.8851, indicating that 88.51% of the variance in 
annual wins is explained by the variables in this model. Out of the 22 variables used in the 
model, only six are statistically significant at the ninetieth percentile or higher (and are bolded 
and italicized): Runs scored, home runs, strikeouts by hitters, hit batsmen, hits yielded by 
pitchers, and runs scored against pitchers. The equation for the regression is as follows: 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 =
𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝑏2(𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑) … + 𝑏22(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝑢 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Wins in a Season 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Batters’ Age (Avg) 0.191 
 (0.187) 
Runs Scored 0.070 
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 (0.016) 
Hits 0.011 
 (0.015) 
Home Runs 0.037 
 (0.010) 
Stolen Bases 0.005 
 (0.008) 
Caught Stealing 0.025 
 (0.027) 
Walks 0.012 
 (0.015) 
Strike Outs (Hitters) -0.005 
 (0.002) 
Hit Batsmen (Hitters) 0.035 
 (0.020) 
Double Plays Hit -0.002 
 (0.020) 
Sacrifice Hits 0.002 
 (0.010) 
Sacrifice Flies 0.016 
 (0.026) 
Runners Left on Base -0.007 
 (0.015) 
Pitchers’ Age (Avg) 0.128 
 (0.164) 
Hits Allowed 0.010 
 (0.005) 
Runs Allowed -0.103 
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 (0.007) 
Home Runs Allowed -0.015 
 (0.011) 
Walks Allowed -0.005 
 (0.012) 
Strike Outs (Pitchers) 0.002 
 (0.006) 
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers) -0.002 
 (0.016) 
Balks 0.058 
 (0.071) 
Wild Pitches 0.014 
 (0.016) 
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio 0.673 
 (2.57) 
  
 
Observations 510 
R-squared 0.8851 
 
 The variable “hit batsmen” will be discussed in depth after the last regression, but it was 
statistically significant in this regression. It had a p-value of 0.035, statistically significant at the 
ninetieth percentile. The coefficient for batters hit by pitches was 0.098, meaning that for every 
additional batter hit, the expected number of wins for that team rises by 0.098. 
The variable “walks” will be discussed after the last regression. It was statistically 
significant in this regression, with a p-value of 0.057, statistically significant at the ninetieth 
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percentile. The coefficient for walks was 0.068, meaning that for every additional walk drawn, 
the expected number of wins for that team rises by 0.068. 
The variables hits allowed and runs allowed will be discussed after the third regression 
and compared to their counterparts: hits and runs allowed compared to the major-league average 
and the difference between hits and runs scored versus hits and runs allowed by team. The two 
variables were both statistically significant in this regression, with p-values of 0.076 and 0, 
respectively (runs allowed had a t-statistic of -14.57). Hits allowed, surprisingly, had a positive 
correlation with winning, meaning that teams that surrendered more hits won more games. The 
coefficient for hits allowed is 0.010, meaning that for each additional hit surrendered, the 
expected win total of that team increased by 0.010 wins. The coefficient for runs allowed is -
0.103, meaning that for each additional run allowed, the expected win total of that team 
decreased by .103 wins. 
Strike outs by batters is statistically significant in this regression, while strike outs by 
pitchers is not statistically significant. This dichotomy will be addressed after the last regression. 
This variable will be compared to the strike out variables in the next two regressions. Here 
though, strike outs by hitters has a p-value of 0.024 and is statistically significant at the ninety-
fifth percentile. The coefficient is -0.005, meaning that for every additional strike out by a hitter, 
the team’s expected win total decreases by 0.005 wins. 
ii. Second Regression: Annual Team Statistics Against the Annual MLB Average 
 The vast majority of the variables generated in regressing wins with seasonal baseball 
statistics are not significant. Only a few variables stood out as statistically significant, limiting 
the relevance and correlation of many statistics. Baseball, like every other sport, is relative. A 
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team could have a high batting average in 2001 and see that average drop in 2016, indicating that 
that team’s hitting ability has decreased. However, the sport changes annually and evolves over 
time, making the lower batting average in 2016 potentially relatively higher than the higher 
batting average in 2001. The early 2000s were part of the “Steroid Era,” a time in which steroids 
ran rampant throughout MLB, increasing hitters’ power and home runs as a result. Home runs 
have decreased since 2000, potentially making them not significant when only analyzed by their 
quantities annually. However, when these same team statistics (including home runs) have the 
MLB average for that season subtracted from them, the changing trends in baseball are 
eliminated and the results show which statistics are more important. The following equation and 
regression factor in annual changes in overall statistics by subtracting the MLB average from 
each variable: 
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑) + 𝑏2(𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠) …
+ 𝑏21(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
+ 𝑢 
 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Wins in a Season 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
(all variables subtract the 
league average from them) 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Runs Scored 0.003 
 (0.009) 
Hits 0.072 
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 (0.010) 
Home Runs 0.050 
 (0.010) 
Stolen Bases 0.007 
 (0.008) 
Caught Stealing -0.047 
 (0.027) 
Walks 0.070 
 (0.009) 
Strike Outs (Hitters) -.006 
 (0.002) 
Hit Batsmen (Hitters) 0.090 
 (0.018) 
Double Plays Hit -0.061 
 (.017) 
Sacrifice Hits 0.005 
 (0.011) 
Sacrifice Flies 0.023 
 (0.026) 
Runners Left on Base -0.061 
 (0.011) 
Hits Allowed 0.011 
 (0.006) 
Runs Allowed -0.105 
 (0.007) 
Home Runs Allowed -0.015 
 (0.012) 
Walks Allowed -0.003 
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 (0.012) 
Strike Outs (Pitchers) 0.003 
 (0.006) 
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers) 0.005 
 (0.017) 
Balks 0.028 
 (0.072) 
Wild Pitches 0.012 
 (0.017) 
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio 1.06 
 (2.74) 
  
 
Observations 510 
R-squared 0.8801 
 
 Of the 21 variables utilized in the statistics versus the major-league average regression, 
ten of them were statistically significant at the ninetieth percentile (and bolded/italicized above): 
Hits, home runs, runners caught stealing, walks, strike outs, double plays, hit by pitches, runners 
left on base, hits allowed, and runs allowed. The number of statistically significant variables has 
almost doubled from the previous regression, indicating that accounting for changing tendencies 
and strengths in the MLB shows that certain factors are, in fact, highly significant. The r-squared 
value for this regression is close to the r-squared value of the annual team regression, at .8801. 
The r-squared value indicates that 88.01% of variance in wins is explained by this model.  
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 Runners caught stealing is a statistically significant variable in this regression with a p-
value of 0.084. The coefficient for caught stealing is -0.047, meaning that for each additional 
runner caught stealing above the major-league average, the expected win total of that team 
decreases by 0.047. Bases stolen is not a statistically significant variable, meaning that 
attempting to steal a base can only negatively affect a team’s expected win total based on the 
above regression. This is only true on average, as many exceptional base stealers have 
contributed to wins provided they steal far more bases than times caught stealing.50 Getting 
caught attempting to steal a base turns a single or a walk into another out, effectively preventing 
hitters from hitting with men on base. Each additional out reduces the team’s chances of scoring 
each inning, preventing teams from winning games as a result. 
 Hitting into a double play is statistically significant when compared to the major-league 
average, with a p-value of 0. The coefficient is -0.061, meaning that for each additional double 
play on the hitter’s side when compared to the average number of double plays, the expected 
number of wins for that team decreases by 0.061. Double plays were not statistically significant 
in the previous regression, indicating that teams across the MLB hit into different numbers of 
double plays every year, perhaps more in some years than in others. 
Double plays are turned when there is a runner on first base; singles and walks are the 
most common way to get a runner to first base. Indeed, these two variables are correlated with 
double plays (r-squared=.3146): 
 
 
                                                          
50 “Billy Hamilton.” Baseball Reference. 
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DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Double Plays 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Hits -0.015 
 (0.013) 
Singles 0.125 
 (0.017) 
Stolen Bases -0.165 
(0.023) 
Walks 0.038 
 (0.010) 
Teams that hit for a high batting average but lacking in power can score runs if they successfully 
hit consecutively, but they often run the risk of hitting a ground ball with a runner on first base, 
resulting in a double play. Hits are not correlated with double plays as teams that hit for power 
avoid this dilemma. Teams can offset this problem by featuring singles hitters who also possess 
speed (negative correlation between stolen bases and double plays). These runners can steal 
bases, eliminating the force out at second base and preventing double plays. They also possess 
enough speed to potentially run fast enough to reach second or first base before the double play 
can be turned. This data would serve to counter the results of the variable stolen bases, perhaps 
suggesting that speed is more significant than the insignificant stolen base variable suggests. 
 Hits, home runs, walks, strike outs (hitters), hit batsmen (hitters), runners left on base, 
hits allowed, and runs allowed are statistically significant in this regression at the ninetieth 
percentile and will be discussed after the final regression. For each of the variables, the 
coefficient indicates that for each additional instance of each of the variables compared to the 
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MLB, the expected win total for the team rises by the coefficient number. The coefficients are as 
follows: hits=0.072, home runs=0.050, walks=0.070, strike outs (hitters)=-0.006, hit batsmen 
(hitters)=0.090, runners left on base=-0.061, hits allowed=0.011 and runs allowed =-0.105. 
iii. Third Regression: Comparative Team Statistics 
 The regression below takes all the variables that exist on both the offensive and defensive 
side and compares them to each other. Here is an example: the 2000 Atlanta Braves had 1490 
hits while surrendering 1428. Therefore, in this equation the Braves number for the 2000 hits 
difference is 62. The formula for this equation is as follows: 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 − 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡) + 𝑏2(ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 − ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡)
+ 𝑏8(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑢 
DEPENDENT (1) 
VARIABLES Wins in a Season 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Walks Drawn Minus 
Walks  
0.015 
Allowed (0.006) 
Hits Minus Hits Allowed 0.006 
 (0.007) 
Batters Hit Minus Pitchers  0.035 
Hitting Batsmen (0.012) 
Home Runs Minus Home 0.019 
Runs Allowed (0.007) 
Intentional Walks Minus 0.033 
Intentional Walks Allowed (0.011) 
39 
 
Difference in Runners -0.013 
Left on Base (0.007) 
Runs Minus Runs 0.083 
Allowed (0.007) 
Difference in Strike Outs 0.005 
(Pitchers-Hitters) (0.002) 
  
 
Observations 510 
R-squared 0.8824 
 
The only variable in this regression that was not statistically significant was the 
difference between hits for the team versus hits surrendered by the team. All seven other 
variables were statistically significant at the ninetieth percent level. Not only that, most 
significant variables were significant at the ninety-ninth percent level, indicating that these 
variables are extremely correlated to winning baseball games. The r-squared and adjusted r-
squared for this regression were .8825 and .8807, respectively, indicating that 88.25% of the 
variance in wins was explained in this model. While this r-squared score is close to those of the 
two previous regressions, this model explains the art of winning is more than hitting and pitching 
statistics or hitting and pitching statistics when compared to the MLB average: The variables in 
this regression are more significant and, in some cases, show that relativity, not the statistic 
itself, is statistically significant. 
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Walks 
 Walks were not statistically significant in the MLB regression on the hitter’s or pitcher’s 
side, nor were they significant on the pitcher’s side when compared to the major-league average. 
However, walks were significant for hitters when compared to the major-league average or the 
teams versus the MLB average regression. This indicates that a team that draws more walks or 
surrenders fewer walks is not necessarily more likely to win baseball games, unless the number 
of walks drawn exceeds the MLB average. This suggests that only substantial advantages in 
walks translates into wins. 
In the last regression, the difference between walks drawn and walks surrendered was 
statistically significant with a t-score of 2.4. The variable is statistically significant at the 95th 
percentile. The coefficient was 0.0145, meaning that for every additional walk drawn than 
surrendered, the expected number of wins for a team in one season increased by 0.0145. This 
regression indicates that walks are a relative variable; they can only become significant when 
compared between a team’s hitters and pitchers. According to the model, if a team drew 100 
walks and surrendered 80, the resulting expected win total would be the same as if a team drew 
50 walks and surrendered 30 in a season. The difference of 20 walks drawn versus surrendered 
directly correlates to winning more baseball games (in this case, it would increase the expected 
win total of a team by 20 times the coefficient of 0.0145, resulting in an increase of 0.29 
expected wins). Leadoff walks are more directly correlated with scoring runs and winning 
baseball games, with 38% of leadoff walks scoring and an average of 0.905 total runs scoring in 
that inning.51 This is much higher than the average number of runs scored per inning: 0.506.  
                                                          
51 Dewan, John. “The Dreaded Leadoff Walk.” 
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General managers are starting to recognize the efficiency of a baseball player and team 
that draws many walks; prior to the Oakland Athletics and Billy Beane in the early 2000s, 
baseball players who drew walks were considered inefficient and unwilling to swing the baseball 
bat and hit their way on base.52 A walk is the same as a single in terms of their outcomes: the 
hitter goes to first base in both situations. The only difference between the two is that in order to 
single, a hitter must put the ball in play that avoids the nine defenders long enough for him to 
reach first base successfully. A hitter draws a walk when the pitcher makes a mistake and throws 
four balls to him. This outcome guarantees one base, while hitting a ball results in the batter 
being out approximately 74% of the time.53 
Since 2000, pitchers have thrown more strikes to avoid allowing these hitters to reach 
first base for free (see graph below). General managers have recognized that as hitters become 
more disciplined and refuse to swing at pitches outside the strike zone, general managers must 
react and sign and draft pitchers who throw more strikes than in years past. The decrease in total 
walks since 2000 is the result of pitchers throwing more strikes and forcing hitters to either put 
the ball in play or strike out.  
                                                          
52 Lewis, Michael. 
53 1 minus average MLB Batting Average. Source: see section III: Data Review. Annual team statistics. 
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While disciplined hitters have been getting signed more and more, hitting a baseball successfully 
or choosing to take a pitch is usually more difficult than throwing consistent strikes. Baseball 
hitters do not hit for a higher average than .400 and rarely do they reach base successfully (hit, 
walk, or hit by pitch) higher than 50% of the time. The average on base percentage for a hitter 
since 2000 is .328, indicating that pitchers succeed at getting hitters out far more often than 
allowing them to reach base. Therefore, pitchers can impact the total number of walks more than 
hitters can. General managers recognize that a low number of walks yielded, combined with a 
higher number of walks drawn, directly correlates with winning. As a result, they consciously 
target players that will improve this difference, especially strike-throwing pitchers. 
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Intentional Walks 
 Intentional walks are a subsection of walks and are more statistically significant in the 
regression than walks. Intentional walks has a p-score of 0.004, statistically significant at the 
ninety-ninth percentile. The coefficient for intentional walks is 0.033, meaning that for every 
additional intentional walk drawn by a team or every fewer intentional walk issued by as team’s 
pitchers, the expected win total for that team increases by 0.033. Since the Steroid Era, 
intentional walks have been issued more and more in pressure situations late in games, providing 
an extra runner in impactful situations and thus directly improving the team’s odds of winning. I 
chose not to include them in the previous two regressions as it is strongly collinear with walks; 
however, I wanted to include intentional walks in the hitters minus pitchers’ regression as they 
tell an interesting story, not only for their correlation to victories, but also to the evolution of 
baseball since 2000.  
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The Steroid Era saw a dramatic increase in power hitters, defined as hitters who were hitting 
more doubles and home runs than any player since that period. Steroids added great physical 
power to hitters. Since 2002 when the MLB began officially testing for performance enhancing 
drugs,54 power hitting has declined.55 Power hitters are sometimes intentionally walked by 
pitchers in key situations (example: two outs and runners on second and third) because pitchers 
and managers fear that they will hit a home run or a double, scoring the runners on base. For 
example, this tactic was constantly used in 2004 for Barry Bonds of the San Francisco Giants to 
limit his impact on the game.56 After Bonds and numerous other Steroid Era power hitters 
retired, intentional walk numbers decreased, leaving a more objective view of the intentional 
walk as a tool only to be used against decent hitters in key situations. Intentional walks are 
directly correlated with winning because they are only used when the team is on the brink of 
scoring runs and the opposite can be said about yielding intentional walks. The difference 
between the two is correlated with winning because of this logic. 
Home Runs 
Home runs were significant in both previous regressions, with p-values of 0 in both. In 
this regression, the p-value of home runs versus home runs allowed was 0.006, statistically 
significant at the ninety-ninth percentile. The coefficient was 0.0190, meaning that for every 
additional home run hit when compared to home runs allowed, the expected number of wins for 
that team increased by .0190. The previous two regressions showed that home runs might be 
                                                          
54 “Historical Timeline: History of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sports.” ProCon. 
55 See: paragraphs discussing home runs (pages 44-47). 
56 Barry Bonds hit 73 home runs in 2001 and currently has the most home runs of all time. The green dot in the 
graph “Intentional Walks by Team: Annually” is the intentional walk statistic for the San Francisco Giants in 2004. 
Of the 153 intentional walks drawn by Giants hitters in 2004, Bonds had 120 (sources: “Barry Bonds.” Baseball 
Reference. And seasonal MLB statistics: “2016 MLB Team Statistics.” Baseball Reference.). 
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statistically significant on their own, but this regression confirmed that hitting more home runs in 
a season than a team surrenders is very strongly correlated with winning more games. Much like 
the difference in walks and walks allowed, hitting 50 home runs and surrendering ten home runs 
on a season has the same impact on expected wins as hitting 70 home runs and surrendering 30. 
To accomplish this goal, general managers strive to sign and draft pitchers who do not surrender 
many home runs while simultaneously targeting hitters who do hit home runs. If the general 
manager signs pitchers who allow a very small number of home runs, they do not have to sign 
incredibly powerful hitters and are instead freed up to potentially target other important pieces. 
Additionally, ballpark dimensions and environmental factors can drastically adjust the number of 
home runs surrendered by pitchers. Home runs fly out of Coors Field in Colorado far more often 
than in San Diego due to stadium dimensions, climate, and altitude.57 General managers are 
trying to win as many games as possible, and increasing the difference between home runs hit 
and allowed will increase the expected number of wins in a season. 
 While the variable home runs hit is statistically significant in all three regressions, home 
runs allowed by pitchers was not statistically significant in the annual team regression nor in the 
team minus the MLB average regression. This can be explained through studying the dimensions 
of major league ballparks and how general managers react to said dimensions and environmental 
conditions. General managers build their teams in a way that plays to their stadiums’ strengths. 
They do this because half of their team’s games are played at home, meaning that possessing an 
advantage in their own stadium is advantageous in 82 games per year. If general managers built 
their team to succeed in the average MLB stadium, their home field advantage would evaporate. 
An example of a team’s success in utilizing these conditions is the New York Yankees in 2016. 
                                                          
57 This idea will be discussed in greater depth in the case study of Dan O’Dowd, former Rockies general manager. 
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The Yankees surrendered 214 home runs during that season, higher than the major-league 
average of 187 home runs surrendered, yet they won 84 games and lost 78.58 They surrendered 
119 of those home runs while playing in Yankee Stadium, 55% of their total home runs 
surrendered.59 Yankee Stadium surrendered 43 more home runs than the average major league 
stadium, making it the stadium with the second highest total of home runs in baseball.60 This 
occurs because the dimensions of Yankee Stadium allow for more home runs than most other 
stadiums. The stadium is 314 feet down the right field line and 318 feet down the left field line, 
shorter than most other stadiums.61 Teams that come into Yankee Stadium hit more home runs 
there than they do in most other ballparks because of these dimensions, yet the Yankees still won 
more baseball games than they lost. Yankee’s general manager Brian Cashman can draft and 
sign hitters with more power to take advantage of these favorable dimensions. He would be more 
inclined to sign and draft left-handed power hitters as the stadium is slightly shorter in right field 
(home run hitters tend to pull the baseball), but this difference of four feet is not large enough to 
warrant a drastic over-drafting of hitters from one side. He cannot, however, sign and draft 
pitchers who give up fewer home runs than others. Pitchers fundamentally do not have a direct 
impact on the number of home runs they give up. They can only impact how hard the ball is hit 
consistently through throwing strikes and keeping the ball away from the center of the plate 
where the hitter can hit the baseball hard. If a hitter puts a good swing on the baseball, the 
destination of the baseball is determined by the hitter’s power, not the pitcher’s ability. 
Therefore, pitchers in smaller MLB stadiums are bound to surrender more home runs while 
giving up relatively similar overall run numbers when compared to pitchers in larger stadiums. 
                                                          
58 Source: section III: Data Review. Annual team statistics. 
59 FanGraphs. 
60 Rybarczyk, Greg. “Ballpark Detail – 2017 Season.” 
61 “Stadium Overlay Comparison.” Clem’s Baseball. 
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 Home runs in the MLB have declined in number since 2000. This can be attributed to an 
increase in competent pitchers or a shift in hitter tendencies, but it’s more likely due to the 
decline of steroid use in baseball since 2000. This decline shifted suddenly in 2016, when home 
runs increased by “13.8 percent” from 2015 and “more than 33 percent” in 2014.62 Many 
pitchers speculated in 2016 that executives of the MLB altered the properties of the baseball 
itself to make the baseball travel further, causing the boost in home runs to increase the sport’s 
popularity.63 Despite this sudden upward shift and the downward trend before it, the correlation 
between home runs hit and wins remains intact, as does the correlation between net home runs 
and wins. 
 
 
                                                          
62 Jerry Crasnick and David Schoenfield. “The MLB home run explosion of 2016: Are juiced baseballs to blame?” 
63 Jerry Crasnick and David Schoenfield. 
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Hit Batsmen 
 Hit batsmen (hitters), hit batsmen compared to the MLB, and hit batsmen minus batters 
hit by pitchers are variables that are statistically significant in their respective regressions. The 
last variable has a p-value of 0.004, statistically significant at the ninety-ninth percentile. Its 
coefficient is 0.035, meaning that for every additional net hit batsmen (batters minus pitchers), 
the expected win total for that team increases by 0.035. Getting hit by a pitch has the same effect 
as drawing a walk or singling: the hitter advances to first base. Each additional baserunner can 
potentially score on a double or a triple, or a single if two runners are on base or the baserunner 
successfully steals second base. Batters constantly lean into pitches and refuse to move when the 
ball is approaching them. They know that if they are hit, they have done their job and reached 
base safely. On the flipside, pitchers are wary of hitting batters. General managers can draft and 
sign hitters who stand close to home plate and pitchers with better control to positively affect 
their net hit batsmen statistic. 
Runs 
 The objective of baseball is to score more runs than the other team to win games. That is 
the most important number in any baseball box score, and it is reflected in the three regressions, 
with runs scored when compared to the MLB average being the only non-significant of the run-
related variables. The difference between runs and runs allowed possesses, by far, the largest 
coefficient of all the comparative variables, with a value of 0.083 and a p-value of 0, as expected. 
This suggests that teams that score more runs than they allow win many more games than they 
lose, with each additional net run resulting in a 0.083 expected win increase. This net run 
differential can be achieved by both low and high scoring teams. 
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Runners Left on Base 
 Runners left on base is statistically significant for hitters when compared to the MLB 
average and when hitters left on base subtracts pitchers leaving runners on base. It represents the 
number of runners stranded on base when the inning ends (example: one runner is left on base if 
there is a runner on second and the batter strikes out to end the inning). The coefficient for the 
latter is -0.013, meaning that every additional runner left on base or one less runner stranded by a 
pitcher, the expected win total of that team decreases by 0.013. Teams score by getting on base 
in succession or by hitting home runs. If teams get runners on base consistently but fail to score, 
the hit by the player on base becomes irrelevant with respect to the final score. Therefore, 
pitchers who can give up a hit in an inning and prevent consecutive hits surrender fewer runs 
than those who allow consecutive hits. 
Strike Outs 
 Teams with hitters who strike out more than other teams are correlated with losing 
records. The first two regressions show that hitters need to put the ball in play to increase their 
chances of victory, and this logically makes sense. Striking out prevents the defense from 
making a mistake on a hit ball and prevents the ball from avoiding the defenders for a hit. 
Reducing strike out numbers allows for numerous outcomes on a ball put in play, while striking 
out eliminates all possibility of the hitter reaching base. Additionally, the last regression shows 
that teams which combine low strike out totals by hitters and high strike out totals by pitchers are 
more likely to win ballgames even though high strike out totals by pitchers alone does not 
translate to more wins. The p-value for net strike outs is 0.001, statistically significant at the 
ninety-ninth percentile. Its coefficient is 0.005, meaning that for every additional net strike out 
(pitchers minus hitters) the expected win total for that team increases by 0.005.  
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Hits 
 The difference between hits and hits allowed by a team is the only non-significant 
variable in this model. This indicates that the difference between hits and hits allowed is 
fundamentally not necessary to win ballgames even though hits allowed by a pitcher are 
statistically significant in the previous two regressions and hits are statistically significant when 
compared to the major-league average. Giving up more hits as a pitcher, logically, would suggest 
that the pitcher is surrendering more runs. However, teams that hit for a higher average tend to 
hit for less power. Home run hitters tend to strike out more and hit for a lower average because 
they are swinging as hard as they can to drive the ball out of the stadium. Pitchers that yield more 
hits, in turn, yield fewer home runs and therefore, fewer runs in general, correlating to a higher 
win total. Additionally, teams that surrender more hits also possess hitters who score more runs 
as a unit.  
 Ultimately, these three regressions show that baseball games are won and lost in different 
ways. Teams can be successful with a balance of decent pitching and hitting. They can put more 
effort and money into hitters than pitchers or invest heavily in pitching and defense. Many 
individual statistics were significant in one regression and not in the other regressions, indicating 
that they are not directly correlated to winning ballgames. This means that there is no universal 
statistic that correlates with winning. A team with phenomenal hitting statistics like home runs 
and walks is expected to lose games if their pitching staff allows higher numbers in those 
categories. 
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VI. Case Study: Comparing and Analyzing Theo Epstein & Dan O’Dowd 
 The efficiency of executives and the team statistics fail to show the day to day and season 
to season adjustments upper management make to put their team in the best position to succeed 
every year. This case study will develop a more complete picture of team construction at the 
hands of upper management. It will contrast two executives: Theo Epstein during his time with 
the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs, and Dan O’Dowd of the Colorado Rockies. Theo Epstein 
is regarded as one of the top executives in baseball,64 having won three World Series since 2002, 
tied with Brian Sabean of the San Francisco Giants for the most out of any general manager in 
that span.65 Dan O’Dowd, on the other hand, began with the Rockies as general manager in 2000 
and had a losing record in eleven of his fifteen seasons. The transactions of these two general 
managers will be analyzed to answer the question: why has Theo Epstein succeeded more than 
Dan O’Dowd? 
i. Theo Epstein 
 Theo Epstein’s first World Series victory came in 2004, when the Boston Red Sox had a 
record of 95 wins and 67 losses. His predecessor, Dan Duquette, was not a “bad” general 
manager, with a win percentage with the Red Sox of .534 from 2000 to 2002. New Red Sox 
owner John W. Henry sought a better than average ballclub when writing one of the largest 
annual salary checks in baseball. Henry fired Dan Duquette and replaced him with Theo 
Epstein.66 It is important to note that the Red Sox won the World Series in 2004 only two years 
after Duquette’s dismissal. Epstein may have guided the Red Sox to the title, but Duquette was 
                                                          
64 Verducci, Tom. “Why Theo Epstein and the Cubs are Fortune’s MVPs This Year.” 
65 General manager data. See section III: Data Review. 
66 “New Red Sox owners oust Duquette.” ESPN. 
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responsible for drafting and acquiring many of the players on the 2004 Red Sox roster.67 68 69 70 
These players were young or developing into talents at the time of Duquette’s firing, indicating 
that Duquette was, perhaps, more responsible for the Red Sox championship run than Epstein. 
Nevertheless, Epstein made numerous moves before and during the 2003 and 2004 seasons to 
put the Red Sox over the top and claim their first World Series since 1918.71 
 Epstein made three key offseason acquisitions, two before the 2003 season and one 
before the 2004 season, to strengthen the Red Sox team. In January of 2003, Epstein signed free 
agent designated hitter David Ortiz72 to a one year, $1.25 million contract, and purchased first 
baseman Kevin Millar73 from the Florida Marlins, signing him to a two-year deal worth about $5 
million.74 These two players combined to hit 59 home runs while batting .301 and .297, 
respectively.75 David Ortiz drew 75 walks and Kevin Millar drew 57. Epstein signed these two 
hitters to improve the hitting numbers for the designated hitter and first base positions, two 
positions where it is essential to have good hitters.76 First basemen for the Red Sox hit thirteen 
home runs in 2002 and had a combined batting average of .237, while designated hitters hit 25 
home runs and batted .298 in 2002.77 Kevin Millar clearly improved the first base statistics, but 
David Ortiz’s addition was more impactful than an additional thirteen home runs and .003 
                                                          
67 Rohan, Tim. “3 General Managers True to One School.” 
68 Chass, Murray. “Baseball; New Owners of Red Sox Quickly Fire Duquette.” 
69 Kepner, Tyler. “For Duquette, a Chance and a Challenge.” 
70 Sheinin, Dave. Untitled Article. The Washington Post. 
71 “Boston Red Sox.” Wikipedia. 
72 “David Ortiz.” Baseball Reference. 
73 “Kevin Millar.” Baseball Reference. 
74 “Kevin Millar.” 
75 “2004 Boston Red Sox Statistics.” Baseball Reference. 
76 Bill James, a baseball statistician, ranked first base as the easiest position to play defensively. Therefore, first 
baseman must possess above average hitting abilities to hold their position in the lineup. The designated hitter does 
not play defense and therefore bases his success entirely on what he does at the plate. Source: James, Bill. The Bill 
James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York: Villard, 1988. 
77 “2002 Boston Red Sox Batting Splits.” Baseball Reference. 
53 
 
batting average. Ortiz allowed Manny Ramirez to return to the field (Ramirez served as the 
designated hitter in 51 games in 200278), creating an additional power hitter in the lineup instead 
of replacing a similar caliber hitter. 
 These hitting transactions provided support in the overall Red Sox hitting statistics, 
improving them from 2002 to 2004. As asserted in the data analysis section, hitting more home 
runs directly correlates with winning more games. Additionally, an increase to walk totals and a 
decrease in strike outs also correlate with winning games. Kevin Millar and David Ortiz 
improved these statistics for the Boston Red Sox. Net walks increased from 115 in 2002 to 212 
in 2004. Net home runs also increased by 32. The Red Sox did strike out 200 more times in 2004 
than in 2002, but this increase was offset by the increase in walks drawn and the 50 run increase 
(32 net). Epstein took note of the Red Sox’s need for more competent power hitters in 2002, 
addressing the situation two months after being appointed general manager. The acquisition of 
David Ortiz and Kevin Millar addressed this need for power, helping the existing hitters towards 
a title in 2004. 
 Finally, Epstein acquired starting pitcher Curt Schilling79 before the 2004 season for 
Mike Goss, Casey Fossum, Brandon Lyon, and Jorge De La Rosa.80. This transaction directly 
addressed the issue of poor starting pitching for the Red Sox. Schilling had a strong season, 
pitching a team high 226.2 innings, winning 21 games, and posting an earned run average of 
3.26.81 Additionally, Schilling started four of the postseason games for the Red Sox, winning 
three of them and posting an earned run average of 3.28.82 Epstein acquired Schilling after the 
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2003 season because the Red Sox started two pitchers in 2003 who averaged over five runs 
allowed per nine innings pitched.83 Epstein’s desire to eliminate this weakness led him to trading 
minor league prospects for Schilling. 
 The Red Sox pitching stats improved from 2003 to 2004 because of this transaction. 
Team runs allowed per game decreased by 0.25, the Red Sox earned run average decreased by 
0.30, walks allowed per inning decreased by 0.2, and the ratio between strike outs to walks 
increased by 0.19.84 These positively impacted statistics correlated to winning: Increasing net 
walks by 80, minimizing the negative net strike out difference, and improving net runs by 29 
from 2003 to 2004.85 Schilling’s brilliance in 2004 shed a positive light on the strategies of 
Epstein. Epstein observed that the Red Sox were on the verge of making a deep postseason run, 
possessing depth at hitting and a few talented pitchers. They only needed one more excellent 
starting pitcher. The Red Sox only won three more games in 2004 than 2003, well within the 
margin of statistical error. However, starting pitchers showcase their value more in the 
postseason than the regular season. Teams drop their fifth and, sometimes, their fourth starter in 
the postseason to throw their best three pitchers once every three games instead of once every 
five (postseason games usually occur once every other day, while games during the regular 
season occur daily). Schilling’s numbers during the postseason resembled those he produced in 
the regular season, only he was pitching more often. Thus, his contribution to Red Sox wins 
increased in the postseason. Epstein’s trade for Schilling directly contributed to the Red Sox 
winning the World Series in 2004. 
                                                          
83 “2003 Boston Red Sox Statistics.” Baseball Reference. 
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statistics. 
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When working for the Red Sox, Epstein had major advantages that few other general 
managers possessed. His budget in 2004 was over $125 million dollars, $57 million more than 
the MLB average and the second highest in baseball. His budget during the 2009 Red Sox 
championship season was $122 million dollars, $33 million above the MLB average and fourth 
highest in baseball.86 Epstein’s success as a general manager is somewhat qualified by this unfair 
advantage. However, Epstein lost this advantage once he left the Red Sox for the Chicago Cubs 
after the 2011 season.87 The 2016 championship Chicago Cubs had a salary of only $116 million 
dollars, $5 million dollars below the MLB average and fourteenth overall. This proves that 
Epstein is capable of winning baseball games without paying excessively for top talent. He 
traded for and drafted young talent for the Cubs, talent who developed into cheap, productive 
players in the Cubs’ 2016 season.88 89 
While Theo Epstein possessed many valuable players and had the means to acquire and 
pay top free agents when he took over as Red Sox general manager, his task in rebuilding the 
Chicago Cubs required numerous lower cost transactions and draft picks to create a World Series 
winning team. The most revealing transaction demonstrating Epstein’s savvy was his 2014 trade 
with the Oakland Athletics. On July 5, the Cubs traded pitchers Jason Hammel and Jeff 
Samardzija to the Athletics for pitcher Dan Straily and minor leaguers Addison Russell and Billy 
McKinney. On paper, this trade appeared to be awful for the Cubs.90 They were giving up 
Samardzija, a 29-year-old starting pitcher who, at the time of the trade, had a 2.83 earned run 
average in seventeen starts that season91. Additionally, Jason Hammel had an earned run average 
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of 2.98 in seventeen starts, lower than the MLB average in 2014. The players the Cubs were 
receiving were two minor leaguers and one relief pitcher, none of whom were, at the time, as 
valuable as either Samardzija or Hammel. However, Epstein had another motive to give these 
two players up: His main target, Addison Russell. Samardzija and Hammel would both be free 
agents after the 2014 season and Epstein believed that they were not going to re-sign with the 
Cubs.92 93 The Cubs were not considered a playoff team in 2014; they posted a record of 73 and 
89. With two months left in the regular season, Epstein brilliantly determined that trading for 
young talent would yield better long-term results than risking losing the two pitchers to free 
agency without receiving anything in return. 
Additionally, Epstein bet that the two pitchers were overachieving and, by the end of the 
season, would sink to their true ability. This was confirmed as Hammel posted a 4.26 earned run 
average with the Athletics, while Samardzija’s was 3.14. Epstein believed that these two pitchers 
were “sell-high” candidates and the Athletics bit, giving up their prized prospect Addison Russell 
in exchange for these pitchers. Currently, Addison Russell is the starting shortstop for the 
Chicago Cubs. He hit 21 home runs in 2016 as a 22-year-old in his second full year as a 
shortstop, indicating that he has yet to reach his full potential (many players take a few years to 
adjust to major-league pitching). Russell’s 21 home runs ranked seventh among major league 
shortstops, only six behind the league leader.94 His contributions to the Cubs last year 
contributed to their first World Series victory since 1908. Theo Epstein traded for Addison 
Russell by giving up two overachieving pitchers who were only under contract for three more 
months. His long-term strategy for rebuilding the Cubs was on display with this trade, showing 
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his ability to recognize and improve the overall talent of the team without spending excessively 
on overpriced free agents. Epstein traded for talented players ready to produce immediately 
while with the Red Sox in 2003 while building for the future with the Cubs in 2014. These 
different strategies highlight Epstein’s intelligence and capability as a savvy executive. 
ii. Dan O’Dowd 
Dan O’Dowd was the general manager for the Colorado Rockies from 2000 to 2014. His 
cumulative record as general manager for the Rockies was 1129 wins and 1302 losses. This gives 
O’Dowd a win percentage of .464, losing more games than winning in eleven of the fifteen 
seasons (O’Dowd has since been replaced by Jeff Bridich, who remains at the position). O’Dowd 
had only one successful season,95 leading the Rockies to one World Series appearance in 2007. 
His losing ways over a fifteen-year span indicate that O’Dowd failed in his mission to internally 
develop a competitive baseball team, while the Rockies as an organization did not possess 
enough funds to compete for free agents with teams like the Yankees and Red Sox. 
O’Dowd’s budget during his fifteen years with the Rockies averaged $14 million dollars 
below the MLB average. While the Rockies’ budget increased, other teams’ budgets increased 
even faster. In 2000 and 2001, O’Dowd had $5 million dollars more to spend than the MLB 
average, but starting in 2002 onwards, every Rockies team was paid collectively less than the 
MLB average. This lack of funds contributed to an increasingly mediocre ballclub. It also 
contributed to O’Dowd keeping his job for so many years despite mediocre results. The owners, 
brothers Dick & Charlie Monfort, were realistic in their expectations for the Rockies’ level of 
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success given their budget. With less money than other teams, O’Dowd had an inherent 
disadvantage when signing expensive talent or making blockbuster trades. 
The Colorado climate and environment also negatively impacted O’Dowd’s ability to 
sign or trade for starting and relief pitching. The Rockies play in Coors Field, a stadium located 
in Denver, Colorado.96 Denver is approximately one mile high, making it the highest altitude 
MLB city by far.97 This reduces the gravity and air resistance on the baseball drastically when 
the ball is hit and thrown, allowing it to travel much further than in any other ballpark while 
reducing the movement of sliders and curveballs.98 Power hitters have enjoyed great success at 
Coors Field because of this phenomenon. However, pitchers refuse to consider Colorado 
because, in their minds, pitching at Coors Field half of the season would negatively affect their 
statistics. For example, in 2016 pitchers at Coors Field gave up 215 home runs, the third most in 
the National League and seventh in baseball.99 No pitcher is going to view statistics like these 
and conclude that he could be successful at Coors Field. Instead, he is going to look for ballparks 
with high-density air, closer to the ocean, so the ball does not travel as far and has more 
“movement.” Additionally, he will track how big each of the ballparks are and pick one of the 
bigger ones to allow fewer home runs. On the flip side, hitters, particularly hitters with power, 
are more inclined to play for the Rockies. After a few seasons of hitting many more home runs 
than they could possibly hit in other stadiums, these power hitters would stand to make more 
money in new contract negotiations. Therefore, O’Dowd’s only available strategy was to create a 
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team that had tremendous hitters, with just enough decent pitching to keep the team in relatively 
higher scoring games, all on a modest budget. 
This style of team is precisely what O’Dowd created during his years with the Rockies. 
Over his tenure, the Rockies averaged 4.95 runs per game and gave up 5.11 runs per game.100 
Both numbers were significantly higher than the average 4.56 runs scored and runs allowed per 
game in that period. Net runs is a statistic that is very significantly correlated with expected win 
totals. The Rockies allowed more runs than they scored from 2000 to 2014 on average, resulting 
in losing records in eleven of the fifteen seasons. O’Dowd failed in his task to create consistently 
competitive playoff teams. 
O’Dowd made numerous trades between 2000 and 2014, attempting to improve his team 
with every transaction. The most significant decline in talent occurred between 2007 and 2008, 
when the Rockies went from playing in the World Series to winning only 74 games and finishing 
third in their division.101 The team went from hitting 171 home runs in 2007 to just 160 in 2008. 
The team’s on base percentage (hits plus walks plus hit by pitches, divided by plate appearances) 
decreased from .354 to .336. The Rockies walked 52 times fewer in 2008 than 2007 and were 
walked intentionally fifteen times fewer in 2008. This decrease in offensive efficiency was 
compounded by poor pitching: The Rockies pitchers walked 58 more hitters in 2008 compared to 
2007.102 This eliminated the net advantage the Rockies possessed in walks, a net advantage that 
strongly correlates with winning. After the 2007 season, O’Dowd was not inclined to make many 
moves as the Rockies had success and made it all the way to the World Series. However, after 
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their decrease in statistical efficiency and win total in 2008, O’Dowd was inclined to trade for 
and sign players to adjust the trajectory of the team.  
After the 2008 season, O’Dowd made one significant trade, giving up all-star outfielder 
Matt Holliday in exchange for Carlos Gonzalez, Greg Smith, and Huston Street.103 Smith was a 
career minor leaguer who only made eight starts for the Rockies in 2010.104 However, the other 
two players—Gonzalez and Street—continue to this day to be excellent. Holliday’s WAR (wins 
above replacement) since the trade has been 26.1,105 meaning that he has accounted for 26.1 total 
wins since 2008 when compared to an average replacement option. Gonzalez, a rookie in 2008, 
has a career WAR of 22.8 since being traded to the Rockies.106 Additionally, Gonzalez is only 31 
years old, six years younger than Holliday with many more years to play as Holliday approaches 
the end of his career. While Matt Holliday has succeeded since the trade, his on base percentage 
and home run totals decreased upon being traded to Oakland.107 They only began to increase 
back to where they had been for the Rockies when Oakland traded Holliday to the St. Louis 
Cardinals for minor-league prospects.108  
Huston Street was the piece in the trade that dramatically improved the Rockies. Street 
posted a WAR of 2.9 in the three years after his trade to the Rockies.109 Additionally, Street 
improved his WAR after leaving the Rockies and going to the San Diego Padres, a team with a 
stadium at sea level and close to the ocean. The ball travelled farther at Coors Field than in San 
Diego, indicating that Street was a better pitcher than he showed while playing with the Rockies, 
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and continue to produce for their respective teams to this day. These two players combined for a 
larger WAR than Holliday’s since the trade. O’Dowd made a smart trade here, acquiring young 
talent in exchange for a superstar at the end of his best years. If O’Dowd’s trade acumen was 
high, he should have been able to make blockbuster trades like this more often. Unfortunately, 
O’Dowd could not make more trades due to a lack of talent in the Rockies organization. 
O’Dowd’s weakness is demonstrated through his ineptitude in the MLB draft. Since 
2000, the only successful first round draft pick O’Dowd made was in 2005, when shortstop Troy 
Tulowitzki was taken seventh overall.110 O’Dowd drafted other major league players in the first 
round, including Jayson Nix, Jeff Francis and Ian Stewart.111 However, these players never 
became all-stars, only average MLB players. Indeed, the only other dominant player O’Dowd 
has selected in the draft was third-baseman Nolan Arenado in 2009.112 When compared to 
successful teams like the San Francisco Giants, O’Dowd’s track record does not add up to 
success for the Rockies. Drafting players also does not depend on salary; O’Dowd could not use 
a mediocre salary as an excuse for drafting poorly. O’Dowd could not trade minor leaguers or 
develop them into stars for the Rockies because he consistently drafted players incapable of 
playing at the MLB level. O’Dowd’s lack of acquiring good young talent caused the Rockies to 
slide into mediocrity. As older players left to sign with other teams or retired, O’Dowd replaced 
them with overrated draft picks who failed to live up to expectations. 
While this case study shows the moves the two general managers made to either advance 
or negatively impact their team, providing deeper analysis with respect to how these general 
managers evaluate talent is impossible. Baseball transactions are public, but general managers 
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take great care to keep their talent evaluation processes secret. They do this to prevent other 
teams from stealing their equations, scouting methods, and ranking systems. Being an executive 
for a baseball team is all about deception; if one general manager makes a trade with another, 
they both believe that they swindled each other and came out on top with better players than they 
previously had. The same methods are used for evaluating high school and collegiate talent. 
Ultimately, general managers are tasked with looking at their team, through the “eye test”113 and 
through statistics, and determining its strengths and weaknesses. The general manager is then 
charged with improving upon the team’s weaknesses, and perhaps strengths if the opportunity 
arises.  Theo Epstein executed his strategies while with the Red Sox and Cubs, while O’Dowd 
struggled from an absence of competent pitching and draft prospects. Theo Epstein proved that 
he can succeed, both in must win seasons and rebuilding periods. O’Dowd’s draft failures 
doomed the Rockies to seasons of mediocrity. 
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63 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 This thesis made two main assertions. First, general managers and presidents of baseball 
operations are judged by their victories and their success based on their budget and some are 
significantly more successful than others. Second, teams can win in many ways, but certain team 
statistics are strongly correlated with winning games, while some commonly used statistics are 
not. Finally, these two assertions were combined in the case study of two executives: Theo 
Epstein and Dan O’Dowd. 
 There are many ways to evaluate the success of general managers that I have not 
discussed in this thesis (and would have given more time). First, general managers oversee the 
MLB draft of collegiate and high school players. These players are signed to minor-league 
contracts. When they reach the major leagues, they are automatically signed to the major-league 
minimum for a few years with no possibility of salary negotiation. Thus, drafting many 
outstanding baseball players in consecutive seasons can produce an exceptional baseball team for 
a small price. I would compile a list of players drafted by general managers who proceeded to 
play in the major leagues, play for more than five years, play for more than ten years, and reach 
the All Star game. This would provide a different way to evaluate the success of general 
managers. It could also be a stronger way to evaluate the transactional ability of general 
managers. I would also create similar variables with respect to trades the general managers made, 
deducting a point if they traded away a future All Star while adding a point if they acquired a 
future All Star in free agency or through a trade. 
 The baseball team statistics considered in the regressions were treated equally for all 30 
teams. This allows a fair comparison between the teams. However, general managers consider 
stadium dimensions, climate, and environment when drafting or signing players. With more time, 
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I would also analyze data from each team individually, considering favorable hitting or pitching 
conditions given the size of the stadium and the weather and location of the city. Additionally, I 
would separate the teams into American League and National League teams. National League 
teams must have their pitcher hit, while American League teams can provide a designated hitter. 
That hitter is paid only to hit the baseball. American League teams therefore probably put more 
emphasis on hitting the baseball, as National League teams only face eight hitters and usually 
one poorly hitting pitcher. 
 As stated in the introduction, the activity of general managers and presidents of baseball 
operations provides a unique opportunity to evaluate day-to-day and year-to-year transactions 
and decisions made by high-ranking executives in a company. These baseball executives provide 
the opportunity to analyze operational strategy, executive decision making, and to juxtapose 
successful and mediocre executives. Yogi Berra was referring to playing and managing the game 
of baseball when he said the following: “Baseball is 90% mental and the other half is 
physical.”114 With the recent trends in general manager skills, Berra’s statement is even more 
applicable in modern day baseball than ever before. 
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VIII. Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics: Empirical Analysis of General Managers and Presidents of Baseball Operations 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Number of General Managers 55     
Number of Presidents 15     
Team Payroll (Dollars) 510 8.73E+07 4.02E+07 1.50E+07 2.73E+08 
Dollars Per Win 510 1077019 463109.9 192288.5 2965098 
Franchise Value ($Millions) 510 536.6686 429.0275 89 3400 
Annual Attendance 510 2452290 683553.3 642745 4298655 
 
Summary Statistics: Empirical Analysis of Team Statistics 
First Regression: Unmodified Team Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Hitters      
Average Hitters' Age 510 28.87882 1.331787 25.6 33.5 
Runs Scored 510 738.6706 83.58667 513 978 
Hits 510 1446.014 82.09656 1199 1667 
Home Runs 510 167.8686 33.78658 91 260 
Stolen Bases 510 93.96863 30.43236 19 200 
Caught Stealing 510 37.69804 10.9657 12 74 
Walks 510 521.2078 70.8465 363 775 
Strike Outs 510 1126.559 137.8167 805 1543 
Double Plays 510 125.8706 15.50356 82 170 
Hit Batsmen 510 56.03333 13.5386 26 103 
Sacrifice Hits 510 50.66275 20.39039 8 119 
Sacrifice Flies 510 44.42941 8.637079 24 75 
Runners Left on Base 510 1139.341 59.20459 965 1301 
      
Pitchers      
Average Pitchers' Age 510 28.61392 1.412553 25.3 34.2 
Hits Allowed 510 1446.014 89.15965 1125 1683 
Runs Allowed 510 738.6706 88.5019 525 974 
Home Runs Allowed 510 167.8686 25.5433 96 258 
Walks Allowed 510 521.2078 66.35465 348 728 
Strike Outs (Pitchers) 510 1126.559 131.685 764 1510 
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers) 510 56.03333 12.20313 27 95 
Balks 510 5.066667 2.610141 0 15 
Wild Pitches 510 52.79804 12.9202 22 98 
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio 510 2.206922 0.4396079 1.28 3.69 
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Second Regression: Team Statistics Minus the Annual MLB Average (each variable is that variable minus 
the MLB average) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Hitters      
Runs 510 0.0235294 70.59272 -197 203 
Hits 510 -3.739216 73.97226 -208 222 
Home Runs 510 -1.32549 31.5505 -74 103 
Stolen Bases 510 -0.3156863 29.46878 -66 103 
Caught Stealing 510 -0.1823529 10.26314 -29 36 
Walks 510 -3.839216 64.53599 -245 167 
Strike Outs 510 0.0862745 107.3296 -308 385 
Hit Batsmen 510 0.2568627 12.98793 -31 47 
Sacrifice Hits 510 0.0156863 19.48955 -46 64 
Sacrifice Flies 510 -0.2117647 8.213881 -22 26 
Runners Left on Base 510 -2.113725 53.78169 -156 144 
      
Pitchers      
Hits Allowed 510 -3.739216 81.56572 -284 235 
Runs Allowed 510 -4.809804 78.70155 -267 214 
Home Runs Allowed 510 -1.32549 22.51164 -74 71 
Walks Allowed 510 -3.839216 59.08498 -205 160 
Strike Outs (Pitchers) 510 0.0862745 99.32784 -271 377 
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers) 510 0.2568627 11.58511 -35 42 
Balks 510 0.0078431 2.584512 -5 11 
Wild Pitches 510 -0.1411765 12.42422 -31 45 
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio 510 0.0412157 0.3365468 -0.75 1.27 
 
Third Regression: Team Hitting Statistics Minus Team Pitching Statistics (exception: the variable “strike 
outs” is pitching strike outs minus hitting strike outs) 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Walks 510 0 93.83612 -292 309 
Hits 510 0 100.6275 -304 344 
Hit Batsmen 510 0 16.57347 -44 59 
Home Runs 510 0 35.80316 -96 107 
Intentional Walks 510 0 17.51362 -63 118 
Runners Left on Base 510 0 72.41932 -219 219 
Runs 510 0 105.2133 -337 300 
Strike Outs 510 0 144.4463 -459 355 
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